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Abstract	
There	 is	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 academic	 literature	 that	 scrutinises	 the	 effects	 of	 technologies	
deployed	to	surveil	the	physical	bodies	of	citizens.	This	paper	considers	the	role	of	affect;	that	
is,	 the	visceral	and	emotive	forces	underpinning	conscious	forms	of	knowing	that	can	drive	
one’s	 thoughts,	 feelings	and	movements.	Drawing	 from	research	on	two	distinctly	different	
groups	 of	 surveilled	 subjects	 –	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	 athletes	 –	 it	 examines	 the	
effects	 of	biosurveillance	 in	 their	 lives	 and	how	 their	 reflections	 reveal	 unique	 insight	 into	
how	subjectivity,	citizenship,	harm	and	deviance	become	constructed	in	intimate	and	public	
ways	vis‐à‐vis	technologies	of	bodily	regulation.	Specifically,	we	argue,	their	narratives	reveal	
cultural	 conditions	 of	 biosurveillance,	 particularly	 how	 risk	 becomes	 embodied	 and	
internalised	in	subjective	ways.		
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Introduction	
Criminological	literature	on	the	use	of	surveillance	focuses	primarily	around	two	conversations.	
The	 first	 discusses	 the	 efficacy	 of	 surveillance	 systems	 for	 crime	 prevention	 (that	 is,	 how	 is	
surveillance	 technology	 used	 and	 regulated).	 The	 second	 examines	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	
surveillance	 systems	 within	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 as	 reflective	 of	 socio‐political	 changes	 in	
liberal	 democracies	 (that	 is,	 how	 surveillance	 technology	 regulates	 us).	 Exploring	 the	 links	
between	 the	 emergence	 of	 neo‐liberal	 policies	 and	 actuarial,	 risk‐based	 criminology,	 scholars	
suggest	 that	 surveillance	 regimes	 evidence	 ‘new	means	 to	 render	 populations	 thinkable	 and	
measurable,	 through	 categorisation,	 differentiation	 and	 sorting	 into	 hierarchies,	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 government’	 (Stenson	 2001:	 22‐23).	 Further,	 in	 focusing	 on	 the	 accountability	
mechanisms	 of	 neo‐liberal	 policies,	 they	 contend	 that,	 ‘the	 powerful	 are	 required	 to	 be	
transparent,	while	the	less	powerful	–	the	poor	and	other	marginalised	groups	–	are	required	to	
endure	surveillance,	even	if	such	surveillance	is	meant	to	be	a	part	of	an	ethics	of	care’	(Johnson	
and	 Wayland	 2010:	 27).	 In	 essence,	 as	 these	 and	 other	 scholars	 have	 argued	 (for	 example,	
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Haggerty	 and	 Ericson	 2006;	 Haggerty	 and	 Samatas	 2010;	 Lyon	 2009;	 Shklovski,	 Vertesi,	
Troshynski	 and	 Dourish	 2009),	 the	 regulatory	 power	 offered	 by	 surveillance	 is	 a	 form	 of	
governmentality2	that	brings	with	it	many	negative	and	discursive	effects.		
	
As	 administrative	 strategies	 that	 prioritise	 risk	 management	 schemes	 have	 become	 central	
components	 of	 law	 and	 governance,	 so	 too	have	 everyday	 forms	of	monitoring	 and	 intrusion	
(Ericson	and	Haggerty	1997;	Feeley	and	Simon	1995;	Hudson	2003;	Loader	and	Sparks	2002;	
Scott	2007;	 Stenson	and	Sullivan	2003).	 Common	examples	 include	 statistical	 algorithms	and	
data	management	tools	used	to	determine	individual	behaviours	and	scanning	devices	used	to	
predict	 an	 individual’s	 next	 plans,	 as	 well	 as	 ‘risk	 and	 needs	 assessments’	 for	 individuals	
(including	juveniles)	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	namely	–	but	not	limited	to	–	those	who	are	
incarcerated	or	are	on	probation	or	parole.	In	doing	so,	these	tactics	are	future‐oriented;	that	is,	
they	 act	 in	 a	 preventive	 manner,	 anticipating	 an	 offence	 based	 on	 the	 presumption	 that	 an	
individual	 or	 group	 is	 ‘at	 risk’.	 Nikolas	 Rose	 (1998:	 177)	 notes	 this	 ‘risk	 frame’	 channels	
‘institutional	practices	and	systems	into	the	following	mold:	assess,	predict	and	manage’	in	ways	
that	 transform	 ‘pervasive	 uncertainties	 and	 indeterminacies’	 into	 ‘calculable	 probabilities	 of	
harm	to	be	managed	by	rational	experts’.	Managing	risks	disregards	forms	of	resistance	outside	
of	 the	 governing	 risk	 frame	 as	 unnecessary	 and	 irrational,	 carrying	 far‐reaching	 effects.	 The	
emphasis	on	risk,	according	to	Clive	Norris	and	Gary	Armstrong	(1999:	24),	makes	each	person	
a	 legitimate	 target	 for	 surveillance	 because	 ‘everyone	 is	 assumed	 guilty	 until	 the	 risk	 profile	
assumes	otherwise’.	In	short,	we	become	suspect	previous	to	an	offense	or	transgression.	Given	
the	 various	 ‘risk	 logics’	 at	 play	 (Ericson	 and	 Doyle	 2003),	 we	 embrace	 recommendations	 to	
attend	 to	 risk	 as	 a	 ‘heterogenous’	 and	 ‘variable’	 technique	 of	 governance	 (O’Malley	 2004;	
Valverda;	Levi	and	Moore	2005)	by	examining	particular	manifestations	in	two	contexts.	Here,	
we	pose	the	following	questions:		
	
 How	do	practices	of	surveillance	inform	notions	of	subjectivity?		
 What	 are	 the	 broader	 discursive	 and	 cultural	 effects	 of	 surveillance	 schemes	 across	
populations?		
	
Our	aim	is	to	highlight	the	affective	contours	of	these	practices;	that	is,	the	sensory	encounters	
with	these	technologies	and	the	emotive	forces	they	index.	In	doing	so,	we	seek	to	contribute	to	
the	growing	academic	literature	that	scrutinises	the	effects	of	technologies	deployed	to	surveil	
the	physical	bodies	of	citizens,	what	we	refer	to	in	this	paper	as	 ‘biosurveillance’.3	Specifically,	
we	consider	commonalities	between	two	distinctly	different	populations:	paroled	sex	offenders	
on	 GPS	 under	 Jessica’s	 Law	 in	 California;	 and	 elite	 athletes	 subject	 to	 various	 surveillance	
techniques	under	the	World	Anti‐Doping	Code	(WADC).	This	paper	focuses	on	how	populations	
endure	 biosurveillance	 technologies	 that	 track	 individual	 bodily	 activities,	 including	 physical	
movements	and	internal	functions.	The	commonalities	between	these	two	seemingly	divergent	
populations	illuminates	how	biosurveillance	both	relies	upon	and	instills	meanings	of	risk	and	
risk	management	 while	 also	 accentuating	 a	 range	 of	 intimate	 implications.	 In	 particular,	 the	
logic	 of	 suspicion	 embedded	 into	 risk	 management	 strategies	 becomes	 transposed	 onto	 and	
negotiated	by	surveilled	subjects.	
	
Predominantly,	in	both	cases,	biosurveillance	renders	people	as	risk‐objects:	that	is,	not	only	are	
they	 subject	 to	 risk	 management	 strategies,	 they	 are	 also	 cast	 as	 the	 source	 of	 risk.	 On	 the	
surface,	 both	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	 athletes	 have	 been	 characterised	 as	 ‘at	 risk’	 for	
future	offending	behaviour.	For	sex	offenders,	 it’s	 the	 issue	of	 recidivism;	 for	athletes,	 it’s	 the	
possibility	 of	 doping	 or	 banned	 substance	 use.	While	 this	 preventive	 rationale	 has	 served	 to	
justify	and	perpetuate	 the	 surveillance	of	 their	bodies,	we	 explore	other	prospective	parallels	
between	 them.	 We	 believe	 this	 discussion	 is	 imperative.	 In	 thinking	 about	 justice,	
biosurveillance	practices	such	as	these	evidence	an	important	shift	away	from	notions	of	guilt	
determined	retrospectively	–	that	is,	based	on	evidence	of	actual	events	and	activities	that	have	
taken	place	–	to	an	impulse	of	prospective	culpability	that	aims	to	detect	future	wrongdoings.	It	
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is	 our	 hope	 that	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 effects	 of	 bodily	 regulation	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 range	 of	
individuals	 –	 including	 ex‐convicts	 and	 professional	 and	 aspiring	 elite	 athletes	 –	 will	 enable	
further	critical	analyses	of	the	everyday	instances	of	biosurveillance.		
	
Biosurveillance	 itself	 takes	many	 forms.	For	example,	 the	use	of	 lap	bands	and	gastric	bypass	
surgeries	(particularly	in	the	US),	which	both	restrict	and	regulate	food	intake,	are	but	some	of	
the	 current	 technologies	 used	 to	 promote	 ‘healthy’	 weight	 loss.	 The	 increased	 use	 of	 Buccal	
cheek	swabs	has	also	been	endorsed	as	a	way	to	not	only	 ‘save	a	life’	by	finding	a	future	bone	
marrow	 donor/match	 but	 to	 also	 collect	 and	 process	 the	 DNA	 of	 individuals	 under	 arrest	 in	
what	 is	 publically	 heralded	 as	 a	 ‘relatively	 non‐invasive	way’.	 Interestingly,	 sport	 has	 a	 long‐
standing	 reliance	upon	biosurveillance,	 even	using	 analyses	 of	Buccal	 smears	 in	 the	1960s	 to	
‘gender	 test’	 athletes	 in	 women’s	 events,	 advertised	 as	 a	 ‘relatively	 non‐invasive	 way’	 of	
protecting	 fair	 play	 (Henne	 in	 press).	 Further,	 biosurveillance	 can	 also	 take	 on	 more	
preventative	forms	such	as	genetic	screening	in	the	workplace	as	a	way	of	controlling	for	future	
incidences	of	occupational	diseases.	To	be	sure,	as	biosurveillance	increases	in	sophistication	so	
too	does	its	regulatory	scope.	In	fact,	 it	even	extends	 into	the	physical	body	as,	for	example,	in	
the	role	of	bodily	screenings	as	a	determinant	of	employment,	access	to	insurance,	and/or	the	
‘right’	 to	 travel	and	cross	 international	borders	 (McGuire	2012).	 Indeed,	as	 this	paper	attests,	
the	interplay	between	surveillance	and	embodiment	demonstrates	very	intimate	implications	of	
risk	management	practices	for	all	of	us,	thus	providing	additional	insights	into	how	surveillance	
informs	subjectivity	on	a	broader	scale.		
	
This	 analysis	 of	 parolees	 and	 athletes	 gleans	 insight	 into	 the	 perspectives	 of	 persons‐as‐risk‐
objects.	 Its	 attention	 to	 affect	 highlights	 how	 acts	 and	 emotions	 register	 in	 visceral	 ways,	
enabling	a	critical	analysis	of	bodily	encounters	with	social	forces	(Gregg	and	Seigworth	2010).	
Affective	responses,	explains	Kathleen	Stewart	(2007:	40),	are	not	so	much	‘units	of	knowledge,	
as	they	are	expressions	of	ideas	or	problems	performed	as	a	kind	of	involuntary	and	powerful	
learning	 through	participation’.	Biosurveillance	 is	 central	 to	 the	everyday	 lives	of	paroled	sex	
offenders	and	elite	athletes,	and	both	groups	revealed	that	they	had	internalised	their	suspect	
status.	Through	an	analysis	of	their	sensory	and	emotive	responses	to	surveillance,	 this	paper	
illustrates	 how	 they	 develop	 intimate	 relationships	 with	 technologies	 that	 surveil	 them	 and	
come	to	view	themselves	and	others	as	‘suspect’.	In	attending	to	their	experiences,	we	hope	to	
move	 conversations	 about	 surveillance	 from	 questions	 concerning	 administrative	 and	
‘scientific’	risk	management	to	those	of	autonomy,	subjectivity	and	ethics.		
	
Relying	 upon	 narratives	 elicited	 through	 focus	 groups	 with	 parolees	 on	 GPS	 (N	 =	 47)	 and	
interviews	with	athletes	 in	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	States	(N	=	83),	 this	paper,	
while	 acknowledging	 evident	 differences	 in	 these	 regulatory	 environments,	 discusses	 their	
shared	affective	consequences.	Through	this	mode	of	inquiry,	our	aim	is	to	reveal	the	tenets	and	
particularities	 of	 biosurveillance	 across	 these	 two	 populations	 and	 contexts.	 The	 following	
accounts	illustrate	how	these	persons‐as‐risk‐objects	cease	to	be	seen	as	individuals	in	need	of	
care	and	support	but,	instead,	emerge	as	suspect	subjects,	a	complicated	challenge	to	dwell	on	
when	considering	how	to	deliver	‘just’	modes	of	regulation	in	these	spaces.		
	
Research	background	and	legal	context	
These	 introductory	 remarks	 stem	 from	 a	 larger	 academic	 conversation	 suggesting	 that	
surveillance	 is	 now	 the	 dominant	 organising	 practice	 of	 late	 modernity	 used	 for	 a	 range	 of	
governmental	 ventures	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Gandy	1993;	Haggerty	 and	Ericson	2006;	Haggerty	
and	 Samatas	 2010;	 Lyon	 2007).	 Drawing	 from	 two	 separate	 qualitative	 projects	 on	
biosurveillance,4	the	centerpiece	of	this	collaboration	features	the	everyday	realities	of	a	diverse	
group	of	participants	and	their	experiences	with	surveillance	schemes	developed	for	monitoring	
and	controlling	their	mobility	as	well	as	managing	their	(future)	risk.	Although	we	contend	that	
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biosurveillance	similarly	renders	sex	offender	parolees	and	elite	athletes	as	risk‐objects,	these	
regulatory	environments	are	distinctly	different	and	are	well	worth	noting	here.		
	
Jessica’s	Law,	which	mandated	lifelong	GPS	surveillance	and	stringent	tracking	of	sex	offenders	
on	parole,	was	originally	passed	by	 the	Florida	 legislature	 in	2005	(Fla.	 St.	 §	775.21)	and	has	
been	adopted	by	43	additional	US	states	including	California	(Troshynski	2011;	Troshynski,	Lee	
and	Dourish	2008).	In	2006,	California	residents	voted	to	pass	Proposition	83,	a	ballot	initiative	
statute	entitled:	Sex	Offenders.	Sexually	Violent	Predators.	Punishment,	Residence	Restrictions	and	
Monitoring.	 Initiative	 Statute	 (later	 renamed	 The	 California	 Sexual	 Predator	 Punishment	 and	
Control	Act).	Most	notably,	this	 law	created	severe	residency	restrictions,	 thus	greatly	 limiting	
the	 location	 of	 where	 sex	 offenders	 may	 live	 or	 work	 while	 surveilling	 them	 for	 life.	 GPS	
surveillance	 anklets	 actively	monitored	 all	 participating	 sex	 offender	 parolees	 before,	 during	
and	after	the	research	project.	They	were	asked	to	discuss	their	initial	reactions	to	Jessica’s	Law;	
to	being	placed	on	GPS;	 thoughts	about	 the	potential	benefits	and	drawbacks	of	 Jessica’s	Law	
including	 any	 changes	 in	 their	 relationships	 (with	 family,	 friends,	 co‐workers	 and	 parole	
officers);	and	changes	in	everyday	routines.5	
	
The	anti‐doping	movement	is	a	global	regulatory	regime	spearheaded	by	the	World	Anti‐Doping	
Agency	 (WADA),	 governed	 by	 the	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 Code	 and	 backed	 by	 the	 UNESCO	
International	 Convention	 Against	 Doping	 in	 Sport,	 which	 legally	 mandates	 governmental	
signatories	 to	 pass	 legislation	 that	 supports	 this	 sport‐specific	war	 on	 drugs.	 By	 leading	 this	
global	 ‘hybrid’	 regulatory	 regime,	 WADA	 relies	 upon	 both	 legal	 and	 nongovernmental	
partnerships	 to	 bind	 athletes	 to	 regulation	 (Henne	 2010).	 Athletes	 and	 support	 staff	 are,	
therefore,	not	only	compelled	by	international	and	national	laws	in	many	jurisdictions	but	also	
contractually	 bound	 to	 comply	 with	 regulation.	 Otherwise,	 they	 cannot	 participate	 in	 most	
sanctioned	sporting	events	(at	least	those	sports	that	abide	by	WADA’s	rules,	of	which	there	are	
many).	Since	 its	establishment	 in	1999,	WADA	has	 implemented	a	multifaceted	approach	that	
crosses	multiple	geographic	areas	and	sports.	Random	drug	testing	 in	and	out	of	competition,	
monitoring	high‐level	athletes’	whereabouts	and	blood	profiling	have	become	common	practice.	
WADA’s	 activities	 rely	upon	and	actively	 encourage	 innovation	 to	detect	 new	 substances	 and	
develop	new	methods	of	surveilling	athletes.	
	
In	 considering	 these	 regulatory	 regimes	 and	 their	 differences,	 the	 impetus	 for	 monitoring	
subjects	is	also	distinct.	Whereas	the	use	of	GPS	anklets	targets	paroled	sex	offenders	after	they	
have	served	their	sentence	for	crimes	committed,	anti‐doping	regulation	aims	to	deter	the	use	
in	sport	of	prohibited	substances	and	methods.6	Put	another	way,	GPS	monitors	and	delineates	
impure	parolees	from	others	 in	the	community,	while	anti‐doping	regulation	aims	to	preserve	
the	purity	of	athletes.	The	composition	of	 these	populations	 is	 thus	vastly	different;	however,	
their	 experiences	 are	 analogous	 in	 that	 the	 surveillance	 regimes	watching	over	 them	retain	 a	
shared	 tenet:	 their	 justification	 is	 to	 prevent	 future	 offending	 behaviour.	 Therefore,	 a	 similar	
affective	theme	emerges:	participants	internalise	regulatory	messages	by	seeing	themselves	and	
others	like	them	as	suspect	subjects,	while	developing	intimate,	and	yet	tenuous,	relations	with	
mechanisms	of	surveillance	targeting	their	bodies.		
	
Seeing	the	self	and	others	as	suspect		
Parolees	and	athletes	 take	deeper	meanings	 from	the	 forms	of	 surveillance	 to	which	 they	are	
subject.	While	the	parolees	and	athletes	we	spoke	to	commonly	see	themselves	as	suspect,	they	
do	so	in	ways	that	reflect	the	regulatory	distinctions	they	face.	In	particular,	parolees	internalise	
a	shared	negative	suspect	status,	arguably	a	kind	of	caste	identification,	while	athletes	come	to	
find	 their	 own	 bodies	 as	 well	 as	 those	 of	 other	 competitors	 suspect.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
surveillant	gaze	becomes	part	of	their	own	subjective	viewpoints.	Parolees	internalise	a	shared	
negative	 suspect	 status,	 while	 athletes	 come	 to	 find	 their	 own	 bodies	 as	 well	 as	 their	
competitors	suspect.	
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The	shame	and	anxiety	of	occupying	a	new	legal	category	of	 ‘Sexually	Violent	Predator’	(SVP)7	
brings	with	 it	 a	 heightened	 awareness	 of	 parolees’	 social	 exclusion	 and	 dehumanisation.	 Not	
only	do	they	speak	of	being	‘stalked	by	the	state’,	they	also	feel	like	they	are	deprived	of	human	
qualities.	To	borrow	the	words	of	one	interviewee,	 ‘It	 is	very	depressing.	It	robs	a	piece	of	my	
humanity.	 I	am	not	 trying	 to	negate	my	crime;	we	are	 talking	about	 the	 impact	of	GPS	on	us’.	
Overall,	they	are,	as	many	participants	reiterated,	‘shit’.		
	
One	parolee	mentioned,	‘This	thing	[GPS]	just	keeps	reminding	us	that	we	are	bad,	we	are	shit,	
we	 are	 outcasts	 in	 our	 community	 and	we	 are	 shit	 in	 this	 society.	 That	makes	 a	 tremendous	
impact	 on	 us,	 our	 self‐esteem.	 It’s	 very	 hard’.	 Another	 explained,	 ‘We’re	 the	 worst	 thing	 in	
everybody’s	 eyes.	We’re	 looked	down	on.	We’re	 hated.	 People	kill	 a	 baby	 and	 it’s	 not	 as	bad.	
People	 shoot	 someone	 in	 the	 head,	 still,	 not	 as	 bad’.	 One	 participant	 expressed,	 ‘Now	 who’s	
America’s	most	wanted?’	to	which	another	parolee	answered,	‘We	are!’.	All	parolees	articulated	
deeply	 rooted	 feelings	 of	 social	 exclusion,	 and	 the	 struggle	 of	 being	 surveilled	 inscribed	 this	
negative	sensibility.		
	
Many	parolees	depicted	wearing	a	GPS	as	akin	having	life‐long	physical	ailments	or	permanent	
visible	marks.	‘It’s	like	a	disease’,	one	participant	explained.	‘They	might	as	well	be	tattoos’,	said	
another.	A	third	participant	expressed	that	‘you	feel	like	you	have	the	mark	of	Cain’.	These	were	
common	sentiments,	elaborated	upon	as	being	‘like,	[using	both	hands	to	point	to	himself],	I’m	
Freddy	 Kruger	 mother	 fucker!	 People	 perceive	 it	 like	 that.	 They	 see	 the	 monitor	 and	 they	
perceive	 me	 as	 a	 predator’.	 Similarly,	 other	 conversations	 centred	 on	 feelings	 of	 individual	
shame	due	to	wearing	GPS	and	how	that	shame	prompts	fear,	as	the	unit	symbolises	a	perceived	
risk	to	reoffend.	One	participant	stated,	‘The	crime	you	commit	should	not	have	this	on	your	leg,	
and	then	you	show	it,	and	people	think,	“Dude,	this	is	a	fucking	murderer,	we	should	kill	him!”.	
Another	agreed,	‘And	the	stigma	everybody	associates	because	they	made	such	a	big	issue	out	of	
it—the	whole	GPS	with	 child	molesters’	 thing.	 I	 don’t	 even	want	 to	 go	 through	 that	 hassle	 of	
people	 thinking	 the	 worst	 of	 me’.	 Yet	 another	 participant	 acknowledged,	 ‘I	 am	 fearful—
everyone	is	after	you’.	Feelings	of	shame	thus	emerge	as	interconnected	with	internalised	social	
stigma	and	concern	about	public	consequences	(that	is,	vigilante	justice).		
	
This	 subjective	 interplay	 is	 so	 profound	 that	 it	 prevents	 parolees	 from	 enjoying	 the	 simplest	
pleasures.	As	explained	by	one	participant,	upon	being	released	from	prison,		
	
I	wanted	to	go	to	Carl’s	Junior—they	had	been	advertising	that	mushroom	burger	
for	three	years,	and	I	was	going	to	have	one	when	I	got	out.	That	day,	I	couldn’t	
eat	it.	I	was	stunned.	I	felt	so	bad.	I	can’t	remember	the	last	time	I	felt	that	bad—
that	day	was	 the	worst	day	of	my	 life.	 I	was	 like,	 ‘Oh	my	God,	 they	are	 looming	
over	my	 shoulder	 constantly’,	 and	 I’m	making	 sure	my	 pant	 leg	was	 down	 [to	
hide	the	GPS].		
	
He	was	 unable	 to	 enjoy	 a	meal	 because	 of	 the	 nagging	 anxiety	 associated	with	 his	 new	 legal	
status	of	SVP	and	the	wearing	of	a	visible	GPS	unit.	This	initial	shock	would,	in	turn,	become	part	
of	his	everyday	life.	
	
In	 contrast,	 athletes	 are	 not	 compelled	 to	 physically	 wear	 monitoring	 technologies	 on	 an	
everyday	 basis.	 While	 they	 sometimes	 do	 wear	 GPS	 units,	 these	 are	 often	 to	 monitor	 their	
competitive	performances,	not	 to	 track	 their	whereabouts.	They	do,	however,	 live	 regimented	
lives	shaped	by	many	external	demands,	many	of	which	orient	around	the	pursuit	of	modifying	
their	bodies	 for	performance	enhancement.	Thus,	 as	Susan	Brownell	 (1995:	10)	explains,	 ‘the	
horizons	 of	 an	 athlete’s	 world	 can	 never	 stray	 far	 beyond	 her	 body’.	 Anti‐doping	 regulation	
shapes	 these	 horizons	 by	 mediating	 the	 boundaries	 of	 acceptable	 substances	 and	 methods	
athletes	can	use	and	by	requiring	them	to	comply	with	various	forms	of	surveillance	including	
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drug	 testing,	 blood	 profiling,	 and	 whereabouts	 reporting	 so	 that	 they	 are	 on	 call	 for	
unannounced	sample	collections.	 If	an	athlete	tests	positive	 for	a	banned	substance	or	 fails	 to	
comply	with	regulatory	conditions,	many	of	which	are	not	unlike	the	complicated	demands	of	
parole	in	the	US,	he	or	she	is	liable	for	an	anti‐doping	rule	violation	(ADRV).	
	
Many	 interviewees	 acknowledged	 that	 regulation	 shifted	 their	 perspectives	 on	 what	 they	
ingested	–	and	on	their	bodies	more	generally.	As	one	rugby	league	athlete	reflected,	‘It	changed	
the	way	 I	 look	at	what	 I	 eat.	 I	have	 to	be	 smart	 about	what	 [supplements]	 I	 take	 ...	 I	 can’t	be	
smoking	 that	 shit	 [marijuana],	 either’.	 Like	many	 other	 athletes,	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 rules	
held	 athletes	 individually	 responsible	 for	 contaminations	 detected	 through	 testing	 (even	 if	
unintentional)	and	that	many	drugs	used	primarily	for	recreational	purposes,	such	as	cannabis,	
would	result	in	sanctions	if	detected	during	competition.	Similarly,	a	rugby	union	player	stated:		
	
I	 never	 used	 to	 think	 about	 what	 I	 ate	 being	 bad	 or	 if	 I’d	 test	 positive	 for	
something.	Now	I	look	at	my	body	differently.	When	I	look	at	stuff	[supplements]	
on	the	shelf	and	after	I	take	something,	I	am	always	worried	about	it—even	when	
they	[support	staff]	tell	me	it’s	okay	to	use.		
	
As	most	first‐time	sanctions	result	in	a	two‐year	ban	from	sport,	many	athletes	recognised	that	
an	 ADRV	 could	 end	 their	 athletic	 careers	 and	 jeopardise	 their	 livelihoods.	 Regulation	 thus	
compelled	them	to	take	responsibility	for	these	risks	to	avoid	punishment.	Of	the	athletes	who	
shared	 these	anxieties,	none	expressed	a	 fear	of	others	 cheating	or	 the	need	 to	catch	athletes	
cheating.	 Instead,	 they	 internalised	 the	 regulatory	 gaze	 cast	 onto	 their	 bodies,	 and	 their	
narratives	prioritised	feelings	of	self‐consciousness	about	what	they	consumed.		
	
Not	all	athletes	conveyed	this	sense	of	responsibility.	In	fact,	many	who	competed	in	sports	with	
documented	 histories	 of	 doping	 (such	 as	 cycling,	weightlifting	 and	 track	 and	 field)	 projected	
suspicions	onto	other	competitors.	One	former	sprinter	who	narrowly	missed	qualifying	for	the	
Olympics	explained	that	he	was	naïve	for	not	using	performance‐enhancing	drugs:	
	
I	 still	 just	want	 to	 know	 just	 how	 fast	 I	 could’ve	been.	 So	many	 of	 those	 guys	 I	
competed	against	went	on	to	the	next	level.	They	were	Olympians,	and	almost	all	
of	 them	were	 on	 something.	Well,	 at	 least	 that’s	what	 everyone	 says.	 I	 guess	 I	
really	don’t	 know	 if	 they	 did,	 but,	 by	 the	 looks	 of	 them,	 I	 am	 pretty	 sure	 they	
were!	I	just	know	that	I	didn’t,	and	I	don’t	know	how	fast	I	could’ve	been.		
	
He	disclosed	that	some	of	his	friends	had	used	performance‐enhancing	drugs,	prompting	him	to	
presume	 that	 the	most	 successful	 runners	 had	 as	 well,	 even	 though	 he	 admittedly	 relied	 on	
anecdotal	evidence.		
	
Other	 interviewees	 reflected	 on	 competing	 in	 a	 sport	 ‘plagued	 by	 widespread	 doping’.	 One	
participant	felt	so	strongly	about	the	pervasiveness	of	doping	in	her	sport	that	she	competed	for	
another	 country.	 (She	 was	 born	 in	 another	 country	 and	 therefore	 eligible	 to	 do	 so.)	 She	
expressed	 frustration	 that	 she	 failed	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	 Olympics,	 stating	 that	 she	 could	 not	
believe	others	were	that	much	better	than	her,	unless	they	were	doping.	Her	evidence?	Beyond	
her	 competitors’	 improved	 performances,	 she	 responded	 bluntly,	 ‘Well,	 I	 could	 tell	 just	 by	
looking	 at	 them.	 It	 just	 didn’t	 look	 right,	 you	 know?’.	With	 no	 evidence	 of	 cheating	 available,	
seemingly	unnatural	female	muscularity	served	as	proof.		
	
Gendered	transgressions	are	longstanding	grounds	for	rendering	particular	women	suspect.	As	
a	retired	athlete	explained,	‘[S]ome	of	those	[Soviet	bloc]	women	weren’t	women	any	more.	You	
could	tell	back	in	those	days	who	was	cheating.	Today,	with	all	that’s	out	there,	it’s	not	so	easy.	
You	 really	 can’t	 trust	 anyone’.	 This	 participant,	 among	 others	who	did	 not	 share	 his	 opinion,	
acknowledged	 that	 regulatory	messages	 advance	 a	 climate	 of	 suspicion,	 reiterating	 to	 ‘clean’	
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athletes	that	they	are	 ‘under	attack’	by	those	who	cheat	by	doping,	even	though	less	than	two	
per	 cent	 of	 athletes	 tested	 in	 the	 jurisdictions	 studied	 here	 tested	 positive	 for	 a	 banned	
substance.		
	
Some	athletes	perceived	anti‐doping	regulation	as	an	extension	of	state	surveillance.	This	was	
especially	prevalent	among	male	athletes	from	marginalised	ethnic	backgrounds	(young	Māori	
and	Pacific	Islander	men	in	New	Zealand	and	Australia,	mostly	Latino	men	in	the	United	States).	
Though	the	particularities	of	their	expressions	varied,	all	of	them	relayed	that	it	was	‘normal’,	as	
they	were	already	viewed	as	suspect	in	other	facets	of	social	life.	One	player	of	Samoan	heritage	
said	that	he	expected	higher	levels	of	scrutiny:		
	
I	 expect	 it.	 I	 should	expect	 it,	 because	 they’re	always	 looking	out	anyways.	 You	
know,	it’s	like	this,	they	know	I’m	going	to	be	good,	because	I	am	good	at	what	I	
do	[sport].	And,	I	gotta	watch	my	back	because	of	it.	…	I	got	it,	though.		
	
Rather	 than	 admitting	 to	 or	 describing	 frustrations,	 he	 and	many	 others	 reiterated	 that	 they	
could	handle	it,	paralleling	it	to	other	challenges	they	faced	as	immigrants	(in	this	case,	to	New	
Zealand).	As	discussed	in	the	 following	section,	these	shared	suspect	subjectivities	 took	shape	
through	intimate	relations	with	regulatory	technologies.		
	
Intimacies	of	surveillance	technologies	
Both	 parolees	 and	 athletes	 maintained	 close,	 albeit	 conflicted,	 relationships	 with	 the	
technologies	of	surveillance	aimed	at	their	bodies.	For	parolees,	feelings	of	exclusion,	difference	
and	indignity	were	main	tempers	that	shaped	their	perspectives	of	themselves	as	suspect,	thus	
promoting	a	continued	sense	of	marginality	and	uncertainty.	Athletes	shared	similar	concerns.	
In	particular,	they	came	to	doubt	their	peers’	compliance	and	to	fear	authorities	while	also	being	
made	to	feel	like	a	‘criminal’,	even	though	they	had,	in	many	cases,	not	committed	an	offence.	
	
For	 instance,	 once	 released	 from	prison,	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 are	 equipped	with	 a	 GPS	 unit	
worn	around	 the	ankle.	They	are	 then	 told,	briefly,	how	 the	 technology	works	 (that	 it	 ‘tracks’	
them),	to	charge	the	unit	regularly,	and	not	to	get	it	wet	or	tamper	with	it	(otherwise	a	parole	
violation	would	 ensue).	 Parolees	 are	 therefore	 constantly	 concerned	with	 the	maintenance	of	
their	 GPS	 unit,	 even	 though	 their	 technological	 knowledge	 of	 GPS	 and	 how	 it	 ‘tracks’	 them	
varies.	What	is	common	is	how	the	GPS	unit	becomes	both	inconvenient	and	risky.	
	
Participants	described	how	GPS	was	a	daily	hindrance	that	impacted	how	they	navigated	their	
life,	thus	making	many	so‐called	‘normal’	activities	impossible.	In	speaking	about	always	being	
aware	of	the	unit,	a	parolee,	 like	many	others,	mentioned,	 ‘You	can’t	wear	shorts,	because	you	
have	to	try	to	hide	it.	It’s	a	stigma.	People	look	at	you	so	you	have	to	hide	it’.	Feeling	physically	
uncomfortable	 in	 public,	 parolees	 often	 changed	 their	 outward	 appearance	 for	 two	 primary	
reasons.	 First,	 they	 acknowledged	 the	 need	 to	 cover	 and	 safeguard	 the	GPS	 unit	 so	 as	 to	 not	
receive	 violations	 for	 tampering.	 Secondly,	 they	 hid	 the	 unit	 to	 safeguard	 themselves	 and	
minimise	 public	 shame.	 Several	 participants	 also	 commented	 on	 changes	 in	 physical	 activity,	
and	many	elucidated	that	they	the	felt	a	loss	of	freedom	and	mobility:	 ‘You’re	not	as	free	to	go	
places	once	you’re	invited	to	do	different	things.	You	can’t	do	as	much	…	It’s	a	big	life	stopper’.	
Relationships	 with	 personal	 GPS	 units	 directly	 informed	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 parolees’	
identity	from	being	active,	social	individuals	to	inactive,	suspect	subjects.		
	
Being	equipped	with	GPS	also	prompted	changes	to	daily	hygiene	routines	and	physical	leisure	
activities	 as	 well	 as	 concerns	 about	 physical	 injuries/harm.	 One	 participant	 explained	 that	
parole	agents	 ‘tell	 you	 that	you	can’t	 take	a	bath,	we	can’t	go	 swimming,	we	can’t	 take	a	 long	
shower	even	if	you	like	long	showers’.	In	discussing	problems	with	GPS	units	during	one	focus	
group,	 a	 participant	 laughed,	 saying:	 ‘Once	 it	 came	 up	 as	 a	 technical	 violation.	 They	 [Parole	
Kathryn	Henne	and	Emily	Troshynski:	Suspect	Subjects:	Affects	of	Bodily	Regulation	
	
IJCJ&SD			107	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
officers]	thought	I	was	tampering	with	 it.	They	came	out,	 looked	at	 it,	opened	it	up	and	found	
water’.	To	this,	another	parolee	responded,	‘See,	these	things	can’t	be	too	accurate.	It	seems	like	
they’re	going	to	get	you	into	trouble	without	you	doing	anything’.	
	
Through	their	experiences	with	these	fragile	GPS	units,	parolees	interpreted	conditions	placed	
upon	them	as	not	being	about	helping	them	succeed	as	 individuals	but	about	helping	 the	GPS	
remain	active	and	 functioning.	The	relationship	between	man	and	machine	became	one	of	co‐
dependence,	 so	 much	 so	 that	 it	 hindered	 parolees’	 personal	 physical	 and	 emotional	
preservation.		
	
Interviewees	 expressed	 intense	 frustration	 over	 not	 being	 able	 to	 appropriately	 cleanse	
themselves	or	engage	in	social	activities.	They	longed	for	normalcy.	One	said,	‘I	just	want	to	take	
a	 long	 soak	 in	 the	bathtub!’.	Another	mentioned,	 ‘Since	 the	 first	 day	 they	put	 that	 [GPS]	on,	 I	
couldn’t	take	a	bath.	I	had	wanted	one	since	prison’.	Despite	attempts	to	preserve	devices,	units	
caused	 personal	 injury.	 Burns,	 lesions,	 scabs	 and	 scars	 were	 common,	 as	 was	 apprehension	
about	long‐term	health	consequences.	As	one	described:		
	
I	 almost	 broke	my	 leg	 getting	 it	 snagged	up.	But	 one	 thing	 I’ve	 always	 thought	
about,	you	know	cell	phones	and	microwaves?	What	affect	do	these	have	over	the	
long	 term	 with	 cellular	 structure	 and	 microwaves?	 You’re	 being	 exposed	 to	
something	you	don’t	want	to	be	exposed	to.		
	
Another	parolee	even	asked,	‘What	does	this	button	mean	[pointing	to	his	GPS]?	It	says,	“Don’t	
touch”.	Does	it	blow	you	up?’.	Their	remarks	highlighted	a	catch‐22:	though	promoted	as	a	safe	
and	effective	 tool	 for	 the	 supervision	of	parolees,	 the	 limitations	and	physical	hazards	of	GPS	
preoccupied	participants.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 injuries,	 some	 parolees	 revealed	 anxieties	 about	 meeting	 health	 care	
practitioners.	One	stated,	‘I	am	embarrassed.	I	haven’t	been	to	a	doctor	since	I	got	it’.	Two	other	
participants	discussed	how	they	normalised	conversations	while	visiting	their	doctor,	one	lying	
that	the	unit	was	an	MP3	player	and	another	stating	that	it	was	a	condition	of	bail	for	vehicular	
manslaughter,	 not	 a	 sex	 offense.	 Several	 others	 shared	 similar	 stories,	 including	 one	 that	
resulted	in	a	delayed	surgery	because	he	had	to	go	through	an	extended	process	to	temporarily	
remove	the	GPS	unit.	In	sum,	the	risks	of	the	anklets	had	far‐reaching	effects.	
	
Anti‐doping	 surveillance	 also	 exacerbated	 risks	 for	 athletes,	 prompting	 criticisms	 that	 these	
forms	of	biosurveillance	incentivise	more	dangerous	doping	products	that	evade	detection.	For	
interviewees,	risk	gave	way	to	fear	of	authorities,	not	doping.	Many	athletes	characterised	anti‐
doping	 regulation	 as	 a	 monitoring	 system	 in	 place	 to	 ‘catch’	 rather	 than	 help	 them.	 They	
expressed	resentment	toward	being	monitored	‘like	criminals’,	rarely	acknowledging	that	some	
anti‐doping	 agencies	 try	 to	 help	 them	 avoid	 inadvertent	 ADRVs.	 Instead,	 on	 more	 than	 one	
occasion,	 athletes	 asked	 if	 authorities	 wanted	 access	 to	 interview	 transcripts,	 explaining	
regulators	‘wanted	to	know	everything	else’.8		
		
Most	 participants	 complained	 about	 restricted	 mobility	 due	 to	 the	 Whereabouts	 Program,	
which	 requires	 athletes	 to	 provide	 information	 regarding	 where	 they	 are,	 in	 or	 out	 of	
competition.	 Although	 surveillance	was	 not	 always	 physically	 present	 (compared	 to	 how	 sex	
offenders	 endure	GPS	units),	 anxieties	 around	 the	 scope	 and	power	 of	 surveillance	were	 still	
prevalent.	 For	 example,	 although	 anti‐doping	 agencies	 provide	 information	 regarding	
substances,	many	participants	were	reluctant	to	ask	them	or	call	the	information	hotlines.	One	
Australian	athlete	stated,	 ‘If	 I	call	 the	hotline,	they	may	start	tracking	me’.	Even	though	he	did	
not	think	he	was	doing	anything	wrong,	he	became	increasingly	suspicious	of	sport	staff	when	
high‐profile	doping	accusations	surfaced.	Other	athletes	shared	this	suspicion,	stating	that	they	
had	 already	 been	 ‘treated	 like	 lab	 rats’	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 people	 –	 for	 research	 studies	 and	
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performance	 evaluations.	Overall,	 they	 retained	 a	 common	distrust	 but	 did	not	 express	 these	
feelings	 to	authorities	because	 they	were	nervous	about	possible	 consequences	or	 ‘just	didn’t	
see	the	point	because	it	won’t	change	things’.	
	
Gendered	distinctions	also	emerged,	particularly	 regarding	 resistance	 to	 surveillance.	For	 five	
female	 participants,	 it	 crystallised	 around	 urine	 sample	 collection	 for	 drug	 testing	 which,	 as	
described	by	one	athlete,	required	‘being	naked	from	the	nipple	down’.	Almost	all	athletes	came	
to	accept	it	as	a	‘tradeoff’	for	being	elite	competitors,	but	many	women	reflected	on	the	shock	of	
their	first	sample	collection.	As	one	stated,	‘They	tell	you	what	it’s	going	to	be	like,	but	you	don’t	
get	it	until	you	are	there	naked	peeing	in	front	of	someone’.	Another	affirmed,	‘The	first	time	felt	
like	I	was	being	violated’.	Others	described	programs	that	sent	adolescents	home	with	cups	to	
‘practice’.	Overall,	interviewees	often	normalised	biosurveillance,	suggesting	that	regular	bodily	
scrutiny	and	intrusion	are	tacitly	accepted	duties	of	elite	competitors	today.	
	
In	bringing	these	case	studies	together,	the	everyday	experiences	of	sex	offender	parolees	and	
elite	athletes	highlight	the	extent	to	which	they	feel	inundated	with	negative	connotations	that	
stem	from	biosurveillance	(for	example,	what	they	can	not	do,	where	they	are	prohibited	from	
physically	 being,	 how	 they	 suspect	 themselves	 and	 others	 like	 them	 to	 be	 at‐risk	 to	 either	
reoffend	 or	 dope).	 Comparatively	 considering	 them	 gleans	 insights	 into	 the	 intimate	 and	 co‐
constitutive	relationships	formed	between	the	subjects	of	surveillance	and	the	biosurveillance	
processes.	 Together,	 they	 illuminate	 how	 biosurveillance	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 device	 placed	 upon	
bodies	but,	rather,	a	process	that	in	part	shapes	who	surveilled	subjects	become.		
	
Conclusion	
The	focus	on	affect	attests	to	how	these	surveilled	subjects	respond	to	feeling	as	though	they	are	
continuously	watched.	They	 internalise	messages	about	 themselves	and	others	 seemingly	 like	
them	 as	 being	 ‘suspect’.	 Despite	 evident	 differences	 between	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	
athletes,	 they	 both	 emerge	 as	 ‘at	 risk’	 for	 future	 offending	 behaviour,	 thus	 justifying	 and	
perpetuating	 surveillance.	 Though	 preventative	 in	 aim,	 biosurveillance	 exacerbates	 risk	 and	
risk‐taking	in	ways	that	subjects	both	internalise	viscerally	and	negotiate	actively.	This	analysis	
reveals	 some	 of	 participants’	 complex	 relationships	 with	 mechanisms	 of	 surveillance	 that	
govern	their	mobility,	bodily	behaviours	and	desires.		
	
Perspectives	featured	here	provide	insight	into	how	biosurveillance	is	a	co‐constitutive	process.	
The	 picture	 that	 it	 presents	 complicates	 depictions	 of	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 as	 merely	
predatorial	 subjects	 and	 those	 of	 elite	 athletes	 as	 merely	 privileged	 persons.	 Participants’	
feelings	 about	 their	 engagement	 with	 biosurveillance	 also	 highlight	 that	 regulation	 feels	
constant	and	pressing,	a	tension	that	becomes	part	of	who	they	are.	Not	only	do	the	boundaries	
between	human	and	surveillance	become	blurred,	confounded	and	interrelated	but	so,	 too,	do	
the	 boundaries	 of	 regulation.	 Understood	 through	 an	 affective	 lens,	 biosurveillance	 as	 a	
regulatory	 tactic	 shifts	 risk	 and	 responsibility	 onto	 individuals;	 however,	 in	 so	 doing,	 this	
process	 also	 implicates	 regulatees’	 embodied	 subjectivity.	 Our	 participants’	 suspect	 subject	
status	 therefore	points	 to	broader	 concerns	 around	 justice	 and	 its	possibility	 in	 these	 spaces,	
three	of	which	we	highlight	by	way	of	conclusion.		
	
First,	 the	 use	 of	 biosurveillance,	 by	 presuming	 and	 instilling	 suspicion,	 often	 forecloses	more	
democratic	forms	of	governance	under	the	presumption	that	the	persons	subject	to	surveillance	
are	 inherently	 ‘at‐risk’	 for	 offending	 or	 are	 otherwise	 exceptional	 classes	 of	 people.	 In	 other	
words,	 participants’	 experiences	 exemplify	 how	 a	 range	 of	 persons	 cease	 to	 be	 seen	 as	
individuals	with	rights	but,	instead,	as	suspect	subjects.	Second,	and	closely	related	to	the	first	
point,	 is	 how	 the	 presumptive	 need	 for	 surveillance	 erodes	 these	 individuals’	 and	 groups’	
abilities	 to	 assert	 rights‐claims	 to	 privacy	 and	 bodily	 integrity.	 That	 is,	 how	 does	 one	 affirm	
these	rights	when	law	and	regulation	has	already	rendered	their	body	open	to	surveillance	and	
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scrutiny,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	of	 evidence	 that	 these	 technologies	deter	 the	offences	 that	 they	
claim	to	guard	against?9		
	
Third,	these	technologies,	if	anything,	have	actually	enabled	policymakers	to	expand	the	number	
of	 violations	 that	 can	 fall	 under	 these	 suspect	 categories.	 For	 sex	 offender	 parolees,	 they	 are	
forced	to	navigate	a	long	list	of	new	felony	parole	violations	intimately	connected	to	the	wearing	
and	maintenance	of	GPS	units.	 For	 athletes,	 they	negotiate	 a	 series	 of	 biological	profiling	and	
whereabouts	 requirements	 and	 face	 sanctions	 for	 unintentional	 trangressions	 or	 failure	 to	
comply	 with	 reporting	 requirements.	 In	 sum,	 biosuveillance	 via	 ‘prevention’	 actually	 makes	
things	 –	 or	 life	 more	 generally	 –	 more	 dangerous	 for	 those	 being	 regulated.	 Consequently,	
biosurveillance	 becomes	 a	 preventive	 performance	 at	 best,	 one	 that	 carries	 enduring	 effects.	
Not	only	is	biosurveillance	itself	intrusive,	in	the	pursuit	of	rendering	bodies	more	transparent	
to	authorities,	it	also	brings	about	an	onslaught	of	more	rules	and	innovations	in	order	to	‘see’	
more	of	 individuals	and	groups	and	their	whereabouts.	Further,	 finding	an	offence,	not	simply	
preventing	the	risk	of	an	offence,	is	the	motivating	force	for	this	expansion.		
	
While	 criminologists	have	brought	 attention	 to	 issues	of	 ‘pre‐crime’	 as	 an	anticipation	of	 risk	
and	a	broader	shift	in	temporal	orientation	(Zedner	2007),	we	still	know	little	about	how	these	
logics	come	to	bear	on	citizens	and	how	they	erode	understandings	of	full	citizenship	rights	and	
bodily	integrity.	Narratives	about	the	lived	realities	of	biosurveillance	schemes	help	us	to	better	
understand	 crucial	 elements	 of	 the	 interplay	 of	 crime	 and	 law,	 technology	 and	 subjectivity.	
What	happens,	though,	as	these	practices	becomes	increasingly	widespread,	working	within	our	
own	 everyday	 lives,	 not	 simply	 with	 those	 deemed	 criminal	 (like	 sex	 offender	 parolees)	 or	
exceptional	 (like	elite	athletes)?	 Indeed,	 there	are	countless	examples:	state	policing	agencies’	
use	of	information	and	communication	technologies	(ICTs)	to	access	citizen’s	 location;	the	use	
of	ANPR	cameras	set	alongside	our	public	roadways	 to	 track	the	speed	of	your	mobile	as	you	
drive;	Facebook	to	find	bail	jumpers	and	confirm	the	whereabouts	of	a	mother	going	through	a	
child	custody	hearing;	and	Google	Earth	and	Street	View	to	provide	extra	 ‘eyes	on	 the	street’.	
Federal	 governments	 have	 begun	 to	 use	 facial	 recognition	 software	 to	 identify	 offending	
behaviour	patterns,	including	hairstyle,	eye	colour	and	ethnicity,	that	are	then	‘matched’	to	risk	
profiles	as	well	as	Radio	Frequency	Identification	(RFID)	chips	secured	within	the	thin	pages	of	
our	 passports	 to	 document,	 confirm	 and	 track	 the	 international	 travels	 of	 citizens.	 These	
practices	co‐exist	alongside	the	presence	of	closed‐circuit	television	(CCTV)	and	a	collection	of	
detailed	 mobile‐phone	 records,	 further	 suggesting	 that	 such	 surveillance	 is	 widespread	 and	
routine.	What,	then,	are	the	broader	effects	–	and	affects?	
	
Although	the	everyday	citizen	does	not	yet	endure	biosurveillance	in	the	ways	that	parolees	and	
athletes	 do	 in	 our	 analysis,	 a	 common	 concern	 around	 transparency	 emerges;	 not	 the	
transparency	assumed	to	be	a	kind	of	‘check’	on	governing	authorities	but	a	bodily	transparency	
that	makes	 one	more	 visible	 to	 both	 public	 and	 private	 agencies	 alike.	What	 becomes	 of	 our	
‘rights’,	as	well	as	our	sense	of	self,	autonomy	and	privacy,	in	light	of	these	shifts	in	governance	
strategies?	The	narratives	of	sex	offender	parolees	and	elite	athletes	point	 to	a	 larger	 issue	at	
stake:	what	happens	when	individuals	and	their	bodies	are	coerced	into	becoming	so	visible	and	
transparent	that	they	begin	to	view	themselves	as	that	thing	they	were	proscribed	as	being	at‐
risk	of	becoming?	
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1	This	paper	is	based	on	research	supported	by	the	National	Science	Foundation	(Grants	No.	SES‐0851536	and	SES‐
0961803)	and	the	 International	Olympic	Committee.	We	are	grateful	 to	 the	participants	whose	stories	made	this	
collaborative	research	article	possible.	We	thank	Elliott	Currie,	Justin	Richland,	Simon	Cole,	Susan	Bibler	Coutin	and	
Paul	 Dourish	 for	 their	 insights	 and	mentorship	 during	 these	 research	 projects.	 We	 also	 benefited	 greatly	 from	
feedback	from	Rachel	Dioso‐Villa,	editors	and	anonymous	reviewers	as	well	as	participants	at	the	Crime,	Justice	and	
Social	 Democracy	 2nd	 International	 Conference	which	was	 held	 at	 Queensland	 University	 of	 Technology	 in	 July	
2013.		
2	Foucault	maintains	that	the	idea	that	modern	power	–	that	is,	different	forms	of	power	that	coincide	in	subtle	ways	–	
is	not	simply	a	negative	or	repressive	power.	It	also	has	the	potential	to	(and	often	does)	assume	positive	functions	
associated	with	 ‘taking	care’	of	human	 life.	Foucault	also	holds	that	biopolitics	constitute	a	 transformation	 in	the	
nature	 of	 political	 power:	 ‘For	 millennia,	 man	 remained	 what	 he	 was	 for	 Aristotle:	 a	 living	 animal	 with	 the	
additional	capacity	for	a	political	existence;	modern	man	is	an	animal	whose	politics	places	his	existence	as	a	living	
being	in	question’	(Foucault	1990:	143).		
3	 This	 is	 to	 distinguish	 our	 focus	 from	 the	 increasingly	 common	 medical	 practice	 of	 documenting	 vital	 signs	 of	
citizens,	which	is	among	the	practices	analysed	here.	
4	For	 the	research	with	sex	offender	parolees,	 interviews	and	 focus	groups	were	conducted	several	 times	between	
2005	 and	 2009.	 This	 research	 was	 reviewed	 and	 approved	 by	 the	 Institutional	 Review	 Board	 (IRB)	 and	 was	
compliant	with	human	subjects	protection	rules	and	regulations	(Human	Subjects	Approval,	UCI	HS	#	2005‐4681;	
EMOD	#	3178,	2006,	2007,	2008).	For	the	research	working	with	athletes,	interviews	and	participant	observation	
took	place	during	2008‐2011.	This	research	was	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	IRB	and	was	compliant	with	human	
subjects	protection	rules	and	regulations	(Human	Subjects	Approval,	UCI	HS	#2008‐6153.)	
5	Transcripts	were	created,	collected,	and	reviewed	by	one	of	the	authors.	In	both	analyses,	qualitative	analysis	that	
followed	 was	 based	 on	 an	 open	 coding	 scheme	 grounded	 in	 re‐occurring	 themes	 and	 issues	 discussed	 by	
participants.	All	excerpts	presented	throughout	this	paper	are	reproduced	exactly	as	spoken	by	participants	and,	
where	relevant,	include	group	agreement,	consensus,	dissent,	non‐verbal	communication	(as	presented	in	brackets	
[	]).		
6	Under	current	rules,	doping	is	a	broad	category	that	encompasses	many	more	substances	and	methods	than	those	
believed	to	have	performance‐enhancing	qualities,	including	drugs	used	primarily	for	recreational	purposes.		
7	 SVP	 is	 a	 new	 classification	 scheme	 created	 under	 the	 enactment	 of	 Jessica’s	 Law,	 thus	making	more	 individuals	
eligible	for	a	SVP	conviction	(and	civil	commitment).	 It	does	so	by	reducing	from	two	to	one	the	number	of	prior	
offenses	used	to	qualify	an	individual	as	SVP	and	by	making	additional	prior	offenses,	including	crimes	committed	
by	juveniles,	‘countable’	towards	SVP	convictions.	
8	At	the	time	that	this	athlete	expressed	this	concern,	authorities	could	not	compel	researchers	to	give	information	
based	on	research;	however,	in	2013,	when	the	Australian	Federal	Parliament	made	changes	to	the	2006	Australian	
Sports	Anti‐Doping	Agency	Act	2006,	the	language	of	the	amendment	would	enable	authorities	to	do	so.	In	part	due	
to	interventions	made	from	a	host	of	stakeholders,	the	final	act,	Australian	Sports	Anti‐Doping	Agency	Amendment	
Bill	2013,	does	not	include	that	clause.	For	more	information,	refer	to:	
	http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s902		
9		For	an	overview	of	several	studies	summarising	treatment,	rehabilitation	and	recidivism	rates	for	sex	offenders,	see	
Troshynski	(2011).	According	to	a	meta‐analysis	of	eighty‐two	recidivism	studies,	‘most	sexual	offenders	were	not	
caught	for	another	sexual	offense	(13.7%);	on	average,	they	were	more	likely	to	recidivate	with	a	nonsexual	offense	
than	a	sexual	offense’	(Hanson	and	Morton‐Bourgon	2005:	1154‐1158).	In	relation	to	anti‐doping	regulation,	recent	
research	finds	current	rates	of	drug	testing	are	ineffective	and	to	test	at	rates	that	would	deter	use	would	be	cost	
prohibitive.	Based	on	a	probability	and	cost‐benefit	analysis,	the	research	team	concludes,	‘anti‐doping	systems	in	
sports	are	doomed	to	fail’	(Hermann	and	Henneberg	2013:	1).	
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